Two Essays on Executive Pay and Firm Performance by Nguyen, Thuong Quang
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration College of Business (Strome)
Summer 2012




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and
the Performance Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nguyen, Thuong Q.. "Two Essays on Executive Pay and Firm Performance" (2012). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, , Old
Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/14yy-t504
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/53
TWO ESSAYS ON EXECUTIVE PAY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
by 
Thuong Quang Nguyen 
B.A. May 2002, National Economics University, Vietnam 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
FINANCE 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
June 2012 
Appr 
Mohammad Najand (Director) 
Kenneth Yung (Member) 
David Selover (Member) 
ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON EXECUTIVE PAY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Thuong Quang Nguyen 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand 
Two essays of this dissertation study the relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance. These essays analyze both compensation level and compensation 
structure, and focus not only on CEO compensation but also on Top Management Team 
(TMT) compensation as well as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) compensation. 
Methodologically, these essays use different regression techniques to explore the nature 
of time series over cross sections of executive compensation data in order to find a 
reliable relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. 
The first essay investigates the TMT compensation - firm performance relationship and 
finds that the compensation dispersion among TMT members is positively and 
statistically associated with firm performance measured by Tobin's Q. This result 
strongly supports the tournament effect hypothesis and not the equity fairness hypothesis. 
The effect of TMT total compensation on firm performance is also positive and 
significant, even after controlling for CEO compensation. The second essay is one of the 
first studies investigating how CFO pay structure relates to firm performance and finds a 
positive and significant relationship between CFO stock options and firm performance. 
Even more, the impact of CFO pay structure is statistically stronger than the effect of 
CEO compensation structure. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation overview 
Executive compensation refers to the pay managers receive from the company in the 
form of salary, bonuses, stock options, among other components. Executive 
compensation is a crucial part of corporate governance, and it plays an important role in 
corporate finance. As a consequence, executive compensation receives increasing 
attention in both the academic and the practical world. Historically, before the 1980s the 
number of research studies in executive compensation is very limited, and since 1980s 
the number of studies in this field begins to increase exponentially (Murphy 1999). 
While researchers have used multiple theories in the executive compensation literature, 
agency theory, introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is the first and the most 
widely used. The agency theory proposes that executives try to maximize their gain from 
the firms; they work mainly for their own interests and benefits, and not for shareholders' 
wealth. Executive compensation represents a good opportunity to study this problem 
because executive compensation reflects most of the incentives of the executives. 
In executive compensation literature, other theories are also employed such as industrial 
organizational economics theory: regulation and compensation (Hubbard and Palia 1995), 
strategic interaction (Aggarwal and Samwick 1999), sociology and organizational 
behavior: social comparisons and wage dispersion effects (Hambrick and Cannella 1993; 
O'Reilly, Main and Crystal 1988). 
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There is a large debate in the literature about the efficiency of executive pay, especially 
CEO pay. Various researchers claim that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) receive 
excessive payment packages even when their firms do not perform well (Harris 2009), 
while others show that it is not the case as they find that CEO compensation is positively 
associated with firm performance (Edmans and Gabaix 2009). The debate has continued 
during and after the recent global financial crisis (Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann 2010). 
Level and composition of executive compensation 
Murphy (1999) provides a comprehensive overview of executive compensation from the 
viewpoint of labor economists. Executive compensation, or executive pay, consists of a 
base salary, bonuses, stock options, and other components such as restricted stocks, long-
term incentive plans, and retirement plans, among others. The executive compensation 
level refers to the total compensation that managers receive from the companies. The 
executive compensation structure, or pay composition, refers to the portion of base 
salary, bonus, and stock options in executive compensation level. Level and composition 
of executive compensation are objects of two main research streams in executive 
compensation and receive much attention in the literature. 
In the first essay, I investigate the relationship between executive compensation level and 
firm performance, also known as the pay-for-performance relationship in the finance 
literature. While most studies in the pay-for-performance literature deal with CEO 
compensation, I focus my research on the compensation of Top Management Team 
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(TMT) and investigate whether and how the TMT compensation influences firm 
performance after controlling for CEO compensation. 
In the second essay, I explore the relationship between the executive compensation 
structure and firm performance. While most current research focuses on CEO pay 
structure, my research pays more attention on the effect of the structure of Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) compensation on firm performance. As the CFO is a powerful 
executive who is responsible for financial risk and directly makes the corporate financial 
decisions, I propose a significant relationship between CFO pay structure and firm 
performance, even after controlling for the influence of CEO pay structure. 
TMT pay for performance 
Most of the previous studies in executive compensation literature focus on CEO 
compensation (Edmans and Gabaix 2009; Firth, Fung and Rui 2006; Hubbard and Palia 
1995; Murphy 1999). On the one hand, it is true that CEOs play a very important role in 
corporate decision, and it is worthwhile investigating the influence of CEOs on firm 
performance in order to find the optimal executive compensation policy for firms. 
On the other hand, today no one individual can scan all aspects of the business and 
environment of the firm because of the complex nature of the decision-making process in 
business; no one can have sufficient knowledge and information in a very fast changing 
economy (Hambrick and Mason 1984). Hence, the role of top executives in the company 
as a team, or Top Management Team (TMT), is gaining increasing importance in the 
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success of the firms, and the number of research studies committed to investigate and 
understand this role is also increasing very quickly, especially in the management science 
research (Hambrick and Mason 1984). 
TMT is much more widely studied in the management literature than in the finance 
literature. The TMT includes top executives of the firm such as the president, CEO, and 
CFO, among other senior managers. Management researchers focus their investigation 
mainly on the tendency of TMT demographic characteristics such as age, gender, tenure, 
experience, and background of TMT members and/or the dispersion of these 
demographic characteristics. Many of them find a significant association between firm 
performance and TMT demographic characteristics tendency/dispersion. 
In the executive compensation research, the number of studies in TMT compensation is 
still limited, although there are several potential research directions in this topic. For 
example, similar to general TMT research in management, TMT compensation research 
may investigate the compensation of the team as a whole in terms of compensation level, 
and compensation structure and explore how this TMT compensation affects firm 
activities and decisions. 
TMT compensation research may also investigate the compensation dispersion among the 
members of TMT and its influences on firm characteristics on making decisions. In terms 
of the effect of compensation dispersion on firm performance, there are two opposite 
hypotheses in the literature: the tournament hypothesis and the equity fairness hypothesis. 
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The tournament hypothesis proposes that an increase in compensation dispersion 
motivates the competition among executives and thus increases firm performance (Kale, 
Reis and Venkateswaran 2009; Lee, Lev and Yeo 2008). The equity fairness hypothesis 
proposes the opposite: the lower the compensation dispersion among executives the 
better they work for the firm and then the higher performance the firm achieves (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1988; Drago and Garvey 1998; Milgrom 1988). 
The first essay of my dissertation studies how the TMT compensation is associated with 
firm performance considering both compensation level and compensation dispersion 
simultaneously. The results will provide empirical evidence to support the tournament 
hypothesis or the equity fairness hypothesis. Another important feature of this research 
when studying the effect of TMT total compensation is the use of CEO compensation as 
a control variable to make sure that TMT compensation impact is actual and sound. 
CFO compensation structure and firm performance 
While the first essay investigates the effect of executive compensation level on firm 
performance, the second essay will focus on the impact of executive compensation 
structure. These two essays are complementary and together they provide a more 
complete view about the effect on firm performance of executive compensation in terms 
of both compensation level and compensation structure. 
The CEO is the highest-level officer in charge of the total management of the 
corporation. The CEO's responsibilities vary across firms and industries. His/her core 
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duty is generally to facilitate the corporate development to achieve the corporate central 
objective. It is natural that the CEO has influence on financial decisions as they are very 
important for corporate development, and most researchers in the literature explore the 
relationship between CEO compensation structure and firm performance (Murphy 1999). 
In practice, the CFO is the officer responsible mainly for managing corporate financial 
decisions such as corporate financial planning, financial investments, financial risk 
management, and financial reporting. Although CFOs directly manage corporate 
financial decisions, the literature studying the influence of CFOs on corporate financial 
decisions is still very limited (Burns and Kedia 2008; Chava and Purnanandam 2010; 
Fuller and Jensen 2002; Jiang, Petroni and Yanyan 2010). In particular, the number of 
research works on CFO compensation structure is much more limited than the number of 
CEO compensation studies. 
On the policy making side, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) did 
recognize the increasingly important role of the CFO in corporate finance. In the 2002 
Sarbanes - Oxley Act, the SEC requires that both the CEO and CFO take ownership for 
their financial statements, meaning that both the CEO and CFO are responsible for the 
accuracy of the financial statements of their firms. Regarding the executive compensation 
issue, the SEC also requires new disclosures on CFO compensation since 2006, and the 
CFO compensation data has been available in the ExecuComp database since 2006. 
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2. TMT PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Literature review 
CEO compensation and firm performance 
Before the 1980s, the number of research works in executive compensation is very 
limited (Ciscel and Carroll 1980; Lewellen and Huntsman 1970; Roberts 1956). 
Researchers focus mostly on study cases and the studies are limited in terms of both data 
availability and theoretical background. From the years of the 1980s, with the 
development of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), executive compensation 
begins to receive an increasing interest in finance literature, and as a consequence, the 
number of studies in this field increases exponentially (Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; 
Jensen and Murphy 1990; Leonard 1990; Murphy 1985), and most of these research 
papers focus on CEO compensation only. 
Murphy (1999) provides a comprehensive review of executive compensation from the 
point of view of labor economics. He summarizes the executive compensation research 
both theoretically and empirically, analyzes both level and structure of CEO 
compensation and their association with firm performance, and points out some 
differences in compensation among countries and regions over the world. Murphy 
investigates the relationship between CEO pay and performance in the sense how firm 
performance and its measure influence CEO pay. Murphy also summarizes the concept of 
pay-performance sensitivity, which is measured by the coefficient of performance in the 
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regression of CEO pay on firm performance as the main independent variables and other 
control variables. Murphy finds that the total pay-performance sensitivities depend on 
firm size and vary from industry to industry, and these sensitivities are driven mainly by 
stock options incentives. 
On an international scale, researchers also study characteristics of executive 
compensation in many other counties over the world such as the UK (Conyon 1997; Cosh 
and Hughes 1997), Japan (Kato 1997; Kato and Rockel 1992), Germany (Kaplan 1994), 
Canada (Zhou 2000), and recently China (Firth, Fung and Rui 2006; Groves, Yongmiao, 
McMillan and Naughton 1995). 
Conyon (1997) investigates the effect of corporate governance innovations on executive 
pay of large companies in the UK. He finds that executive pay is positively associated 
with current shareholders' wealth but not the wealth of predated shareholders, and 
governance variables do play a role in executive pay. Other researchers (Cosh and 
Hughes 1997) find a positive association between executive compensation and 
shareholder wealth as well as firm size. 
Regarding executive compensation study in Japan, researchers find that the CEOs of 
keiretsu, a typical grouping of enterprises in Japan, earn less than the CEOs of 
independent companies (Kato 1997). In this research, they also provide the empirical 
evidence that the monitoring role of the banks as institutional stakeholders becomes more 
important in the practices of corporate governance in Japan. 
9 
Executive pay in China may display an interesting example of an important emerging 
country in the literature. Some researchers (Groves, Yongmiao, McMillan and Naughton 
1995) study the managerial labor market in China during the reform process in the years 
of the 1990s and find that Chinese managerial labor market incorporates many incentives 
suggested by competitive labor markets in developed countries. Managerial 
compensation is strongly linked to firm performance in terms of profitability, but this link 
is somewhat weaker in terms of sales. 
More recently, other researchers (Firth, Fung and Rui 2006) investigate the relationship 
between corporate performance and CEO compensation in China and show that Chinese 
firms listed in stock exchanges normally have controlling shareholders, and different 
kinds of controlling shareholders have different impact on executive pay. Specifically, 
firms with State agency as the controlling shareholder do not use performance-based pay 
while firms with private block holders as major shareholders focus on firm performance 
when setting executive compensation. 
One of the difficulties of doing comparative research in executive compensation is the 
issue of data availability. The data from developing countries is very limited and 
unreliable. Technically, data from different countries have very different format and it is 
difficult to integrate them in an executive compensation study. This technical problem 
exists among all countries, but is more notable in the developing world. 
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Overall, there are notable differences in the practices of executive compensation across 
countries over time, as well as across firms and industries (Murphy 1999). It makes 
international research in executive compensation more difficult. 
Top Management Team theory 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) are two of the first authors in management science 
investigating the "upper echelons" theory that refers to an organization as a reflection of 
its top managers. In the essence of the upper echelon theory, they propose that the 
strategic choices and performance of the organization can be predicted partially by the 
background and characteristics of their management team. 
Following the "upper echelons" theory, researchers in the management field investigate 
the impact of TMT demographic characteristics on firm performance (Auden, Shackman 
and Onken 2006; Hambrick and D'Aveni 1992). Most of these TMT studies focus on the 
tendency and/or dispersion of these demographic characteristics of TMT members, and 
they do generally find some significant relationships between TMT demographic 
characteristics and firm performance. 
Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) investigate the relationship between TMT characteristics 
and firm failure in large bankruptcies and find that TMT weakness, through strategic 
mistakes and stakeholder uneasiness with TMT, causes firm deterioration; and that 
corporate deterioration brings TMT deterioration through different means. Auden and 
colleagues (Auden, Shackman and Onken 2006) provide empirical support for the 
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proposition that TMT is a suitable unit of analysis regarding its effect on firm 
performance. 
On the one hand, the relation between TMT tendency and firm performance is somewhat 
consistent in the management literature. Most studies in management literature find that 
the tendency of demographic characteristics such as age, background, skill, and tenure of 
TMT members does statistically significantly influence firm performance (Auden, 
Shackman and Onken 2006; Carmeli and Tishler 2006; Koufopoulos, Zoumbos, 
Argyropoulou and Motwani 2008). 
On the other hand, the association between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance is 
mixed (Cannella Jr, Park and Lee 2008). Cannella and colleagues (Cannella Jr, Park and 
Lee 2008) find the positive relationship between TMT functional diversity and firm 
performance. Some studies find a positive association (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1990; Norburn and Birley 1988); other studies find no significant association between 
TMT heterogeneity and firm performance (West and Schwenk 1996); some others even 
find a negative relationship between them (Simons, Pelled and Smith 1999; Wei, Lau, 
Young and Wang 2005). 
The literature also shows a positive three-way interaction between customer orientation, 
TMT functional diversity, and TMT experience diversity on organizational performance. 
Researchers (Wei, Lau, Young and Wang 2005) demonstrate a negative relationship 
between TMT education heterogeneity and experience heterogeneity with firm 
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performance. Others (Olson, Parayitam and Twigg 2006) find a negative relationship of 
age diversity and positive relationship of functional heterogeneity with strategic choice, 
they also find support for the upper echelons theory. 
TMT compensation and firm performance 
The literature on the relationship between TMT compensation and firm performance is 
still very limited. The study of Carpenter and Sanders (2002) is one of these few research 
papers studying the effect of TMT compensation level on firm performance. They find a 
positive relation between CEO pay and TMT pay. TMT compensation does predict firm 
performance when aligned with shareholder interest and internal contingencies, and the 
impact of CEO pay on firm performance depends on TMT pay. In other words, they do 
not study the direct association between TMT compensation and firm performance but 
propose TMT compensation as a missing link between CEO compensation and the 
performance of the company. 
Regarding the effect of TMT compensation dispersion on firm performance, there are 
two different theories in the literature: the tournament effect and the equity fairness 
effect. The tournament effect hypothesis proposes that the wider the pay difference 
among TMT members, the stronger the competition incentive among these members in 
order to be promoted is, and the higher the performance the firm achieves (Kale, Reis and 
Venkateswaran 2009; Lee, Lev and Yeo 2008). Specifically, the tournament incentives, 
measured by the distance or dispersion of compensation figures between the CEO and 
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other executives, are positively associated with firm performance. Moreover researchers 
find that the association is stronger when a CEO is near his/her retirement and weaker 
when a new CEO is just appointed, this association is even weaker when the new CEO is 
outside (Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran 2009). 
Similarly, Lee and colleagues (Lee, Lev and Yeo 2008) find empirical support for the 
tournament hypothesis. In this research, the authors also document that the positive 
relationship between TMT pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger for firms with 
high agency costs, and effective governance practices such as board independence 
increases this important relationship. 
On the other hand, the equity fairness hypothesis proposes the opposite: Companies can 
achieve better performance by minimizing the pay dispersion among TMT members 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1988; Milgrom 1988). Some researchers provide empirical evidence 
that supports this argument. For example, Drago and Garvey (1998) investigate a sample 
of Australian companies and find the evidence supporting that the fairness in pay does 
have a positive effect on firm performance. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) also investigate 
the effect of pay dispersion among academic faculties and find that this compensation 
dispersion negatively affect faculty performance in terms of research satisfaction, and 
suggest that the dispersion in compensation produces an adverse impact on performance 
in higher education. 
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Carpenter and Sander (2004), in other research, study the effects of TMT compensation 
and firm internationalization on multinational corporation performance and find positive 
effects of non-CEO pay on future performance of the firms, but negative effects of the 
gap between CEO compensation and TMT compensation on multinational corporate 
performance. This finding is somewhat different than what they find earlier (Carpenter 
and Sanders 2002), and shows a clear signal that the debate between tournament 
hypothesis and equity fairness hypothesis may continue. 
Gaps in the literature 
The first notable gap of the current literature is that most research papers focus mainly on 
CEO compensation. Among those few articles investigating TMT compensation, the 
researchers focus only on one aspect of executive compensation such as total 
compensation or compensation dispersion of top executive members. They do not 
investigate the effect of both aspects concurrently. 
Another limitation of the current literature is that most researchers do not control for the 
effect of CEO compensation on firm performance. Without controlling for the CEO 
effect, we cannot confirm the existence of the association between TMT compensation 
and firm performance. The association between TMT compensation and firm 
performance, if found in the analysis, may be a consequence of the actual relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance as firms may tend to pay CEO and 
TMT members proportionally. This essay covers these gaps of the literature by exploring 
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the relationship between firm performance and executive compensation of TMT in terms 
of both terms of compensation level and structure, and provides further empirical 
evidence for the debate between two opposite theories: the tournament hypothesis and the 
equity fairness hypothesis. 
Research question and hypotheses 
Covering these gaps of the literature, the first essay investigates the main research 
question of whether and how TMT compensation relates to firm performance. Again, I 
will also study whether the relationship between TMT compensation and firm 
performance is still significant after controlling for the impact of CEO compensation. 
Analyzing the main question, this essay hypothesizes that TMT compensation in terms of 
total pay and pay dispersion is associated significantly with firm performance, and that 
this association is still statistically significant when we include CEO compensation in the 
model. If the empirical evidence supports this hypothesis, we can suggest that TMT 
compensation is an important factor in the study of executive pay-performance 
relationship. By answering the main research question, this essay also provides empirical 
evidence for the debate between two opposite hypotheses: the tournament effect 
hypothesis or the equity fairness hypothesis. 
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2.2 Data and methodology 
Data 
I collect executive compensation data from the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp 
database. This database provides comprehensive executive compensation data for 1500 
S&P firms each year from 1992 to 2010, including S&P 500, S&P Midcap and S&P 
Smallcap index firms. This list changes from year to year allowing some companies to 
exit from the S&P classified list of firms and other companies to enter the list. This essay 
requires the availability of compensation data for at least three executives in the firm's 
TMT and compensation data of the CEO for each firm-year observation. 
For each firm-year research unit in my sample, I collect the compensation data for all 
executives in the database such as the president, CEO, vice president, and CFO, among 
others. In general, Standard and Poor's ExecuComp includes the data for five top 
executives of the companies every year. Together with the compensation data, the 
ExecuComp database also provides basic accrual and financial data at firm level, 
including sales, assets, dividend payment, return on equity, and return on assets... 
Table 1 summarizes the description of the ExecuComp database and its main data used in 
both essays of this dissertation. 




Firm performance is the main dependent variable of the analysis. While many previous 
studies use Return on Assets as a measure of firm performance, this measure also 
receives many critics in the literature. Some possible disadvantages are that total assets 
and return on assets are based on historical cost, while firm performance should be based 
on current dollars; Also, firm performance focuses on operating assets while returns on 
assets are based on not only operating assets but also on total assets (Barber and Lyon 
1996). Following Kale (Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran 2009) and other researchers, I use 
Tobin's Q as the measure of firm performance in the main analysis. Firms with high 
Tobin's Q ratio tend to have attractive investment opportunities and competitive 
advantage. I estimate Tobin's Q as the market value of equity plus book value of debt 
divided by book value of total assets. I also use Earnings per Share (EPS) as a measure of 
firm performance for robustness check purpose. 
Independent variables: 
I calculate independent variables related to TMT compensation from annual 
compensations of all executives on the ExecuComp database for a firm in a specific year. 
I collect Total Compensation data item (TDC2) as executive compensation of a senior 
manager in a specific year, which is the summation of salary, bonus, value of options 
exercised, restricted stock grants, and other items. Some studies in the literature select the 
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compensations of only three or four executives from the database (Carpenter and Sanders 
2002). This approach may lose some valuable data and does not reflect the complete 
information ofTMT compensation. 
In this essay, I compute TMT total pay as the logarithm of the summation of all 
individual executive compensations of a firm in a specific year. TMT mean pay is the 
logarithm of the compensation mean of all individual executives. We can observe that 
CEO compensation data also contributes in this calculation of TMT pay variables. TMT 
pay dispersion is the ratio of the compensation standard deviation divided by the 
compensation mean of all TMT members of a firm in a year. I require that the number of 
TMT members of a firm in a specific year should be at least three so that the TMT pay 
dispersion is meaningful in our analysis. 
Figure 1 plots CEO pay, TMT total pay and TMT mean pay over the 1992-2010 period 
and over all 2-digit SIC industries. Overall, we can observe that CEO pay, TMT total 
pay, and TMT mean pay are highly and positively correlated. The executive 
compensation tends to increase over time while this compensation differs from industry 
to industry. Thus, I will have to deal with the potential problem of multicollinearity 
carefully in the next sections. 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
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Control variables: 
CEO compensation is the most important control variable. Many of previous studies 
ignore this control variable when investigating the effect of TMT compensation on firm 
performance. As a result, we cannot confirm the actual existence of the relationship 
between TMT compensation and firm performance. I select CEO compensation from the 
ExecuComp database by computing the logarithm of annual compensation data of an 
executive of each firm with the Annual CEO Flag. 
Firm specific control variables such as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash 
flows, sales growth are also collected from ExecuComp database. Specifically, firm size 
is the logarithm of the firm total assets. Leverage is the ratio of equity book value divided 
by equity market value. The book to market ratio is the ratio of common equity divided 
by market value. Free cash flow is the operating income before depreciation divided by 
total assets. Finally, sales growth is the sales percent change in one year. This use of 
logarithm and standardized variables reduces the potential problem of nonstationarity. 
I also winsorize the data to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers by excluding 
observations with the values of variables such as Tobin's Q, firm size, leverage, free cash 
flows, sales growth, and book to market at the 1 percentile of the sample data. 
For illustration purpose, I plot the Tobin's Q and Book to Market before the winsorizing 
process in Figure 2: 
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[Insert figure 2 here] 
Similarly, in Figure 3,1 plot the Tobin's Q and Book to Market ratio before winsorizing 
process: 
[Insert figure 3 here] 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the effectiveness of this winsorizing process for Tobin's Q 
and book to market. We can observe notable outliers of Tobin's Q in panel A and outliers 
of Book to Market in panel B. After winsorizing these variables, they are much smoother 
as in figure 2. In the case of BTM variable, I also require that it take a positive value. 
Industry performance, the only industry specific control variable in this essay, is the 
performance mean of all firms in the same industry, classified by the two-digit SIC code 
of the firms, in a specific year. All this data also comes from Standard and Poor's 
ExecuComp database. 
Table 2 provides details about definitions and computations of dependent variable, 
independent variables as well as control variables. 




I merge compensation related variables and finance based variables into a data sample for 
regression analysis. This sample includes 26,951 firm-year observations of 3,075 firms in 
66 industries over the period from 1992 to 2010. 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of all variables used in this essay: Firm 
performance measured by Tobin's Q, TMT pay dispersion, TMT total pay, TMT mean 
pay, CEO pay, firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, sales growth, 
and industry's average performance. 
[Insert table 3 here] 
We observe no irregularity in the summary statistics of all dependent, independent, and 
control variables used in this essay in terms of values such as number of observation, 
mean, standard deviation, summation, minimum, and maximum. These results are due to 
the process of winsorizing and transformation of variables, 
Correlation coefficients 
Table 4 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients among dependent, independent, and 
control variables. 
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[Insert table 4 here] 
From this correlation coefficients' table we can observe that variable TMT total pay and 
variable TMT mean pay are very highly correlated with a coefficient of about 98 percent. 
It is a strong signal of a multicollinearity problem among studied dependent variables. I 
need to fix it by excluding the TMT mean pay variable and keeping the TMT total pay 
variable as one of the independent variables in this essay. 
Research methodology 
To investigate the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, 
many studies use the concept of "pay-performance sensitivity", this sensitivity is used to 
investigate how firm performance influences the compensations of the firm's executives 
(Murphy 1999). They run a regression of executive pay on firm performance and pay-
performance sensitivity is the coefficient of independent variable firm performance. The 
simplest form of this type of regressions is 
Executive Compensation = /?<? + /?/ Firm Performance 
The literature also uses first different variables in the regressions: 
A (Executive Compensation) (Firm Performance) 
In this essay, I use a slightly different approach. As the final goal of the firm is to 
maximize the firm value and performance, I investigate how the executive pay influences 
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the firm's performance. Executive compensation is effective if it is positively associated 
with firm performance. In other words, the higher compensation the executives receive, 
the higher the firm performance is. 
I first run the regression of firm performance on all independent variables such as TMT 
pay dispersion, TMT pay dispersion and CEO, controlling for all firm specific and 
industry specific variables: 
Firm performance = Po + pi TMT pay dispersion + P2 TMT total pay + P3 CEO 
pay + X Pi Firm and Industry control variables (1) 
Model (1) is the main model in this essay. In this model, we can analyze the effects of 
TMT total pay and TMT pay dispersion concurrently; we will find whether the effect of 
TMT compensation on firm performance is significant with the appearance of CEO 
compensation in the equation. A positive and statistically significant coefficient Pi in this 
equation supports the tournament effect, while a negative coefficient provides empirical 
support for the equity fairness hypothesis. In Model (1), if p2 is positive and significant 
then overall executive compensation is effective in the sense that firm performance is 
positively related to the compensation all executives receive. 
In the next model, I exclude CEO compensation from my equation to investigate the 
effect of TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay alone on firm performance: 
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Firm performance = Po +Pi TMT pay dispersion +P2 TMT total pay + E Pi Firm 
and Industry control variables (2) 
Model (2) is also a simple way to deal with the potential multicollinearity issue. If 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem, the estimates of remaining variables should be 
stable in terms of sign and significance of the coefficients in comparison to Model (1). 
In the last two models, I study the effect of TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay on 
firm performance separately, also controlling for all firm and industry specific variables: 
Firm performance — Po +Pi TMT pay dispersion +2* pt Firm and Industry control 
variables (3) 
Firm performance = Po +P2 TMT total pay + E P, Firm and Industry control 
variables (4) 
Model (3) provides further empirical evidence for the debate between the tournament 
hypothesis and the equity fairness hypothesis. Similar to Model (1), a positive and 
significant Pi supports the tournament effect; otherwise, it provides no empirical support 
for this tournament hypothesis. A positive and significant P2 in Model (4) shows an 
overall effective executive compensation policy in the sense that firm performance relates 
positively to the compensation all executives receive. 
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2.3 Empirical results 
Table 5 shows the empirical results of Model (1), Model (2), Model (3) and Model (4) of 
firm performance on executive compensation level: 
[Insert table 5 here] 
Model (1) includes total compensation and compensation dispersion of TMT as well as 
all control variables for CEO compensation effect, firm specific effect and industry 
specific effect. The result of this model shows a positive and significant coefficient of the 
dispersion of TMT compensation. This provides strong empirical support for the 
tournament effect hypothesis. TMT total compensation also displays a positive and 
significant relationship to firm performance, showing the effectiveness of the total 
compensation for TMT on firm performance. Interestingly, the relationship between 
control variable CEO pay and firm performance is statistically significant, but negative; 
meaning that CEO compensation is not effective as expected in the sense that an increase 
in CEO compensation possibly does not lead to a increase in firm performance. 
In Model (2), when excluding the effect of CEO compensation, I also find relationships 
between TMT compensation in terms of pay dispersion and total pay and firm 
performance very similar to those results found in Model (1). Specifically, the association 
between TMT pay dispersion and firm performance as well as the relationship between 
TMT total pay and firm performance are positive and significant. 
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I also find similar results from Model (3) and Model (4). Model (3) shows a positive and 
statistically significant association between TMT pay dispersion and firm performance. It 
supports the tournament hypothesis. Model (4) also displays a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between TMT total pay and firm performance. This result shows 
that TMT total pay may statistically affect firm performance, and then we should 
consider this effect of TMT compensation when studying the general executive 
compensation - firm performance relationship. We can also say that the compensation the 
firms pay for TMT as a whole team is effective in the sense that an increase in TMT total 
payment may lead to an increase in firm performance. 
Overall, the empirical results show that TMT compensation does influence firm 
performance. Especially, the impacts of both TMT compensation dispersion as well as 
TMT total compensation on firm performance are positive and statistically significant. It 
strongly supports the tournament effect hypothesis and suggests further emphasis on 
TMT compensation research. As the results of Model (2), Model (3) and Model (4) are 
consistent with the results of Model (1) we find that although the correlation coefficient 
between CEO pay and TMT total pay is high, the problem of multicollinearity should not 
be serious in this data sample. 
2.4 Robustness check 
For robustness check purpose, I will use a different measure of firm performance as well 
as check for potential econometric issues such as multicollinearity and endogeneity of our 
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data sample. I also use different estimation techniques to investigate the relationship 
between firm performance and executive compensation. The results are in Table 6. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
Performance measure 
To investigate how sensitive the relationship between TMT compensation and firm 
performance is to the measure of firm performance, I use earnings per share (EPS) as an 
alternative measure. I do not choose return on assets (ROA) or return on equity (ROE) for 
robustness test because of the reasons mentioned when selecting Tobin's Q as the main 
performance measure (Barber and Lyon 1996). In Panel A, with a positive and significant 
coefficient of TMT pay dispersion, we still have empirical evidence supporting the 
tournament effect hypothesis. Even though, the effect of CEO pay is no longer significant 
and that of TMT total compensation is negative. It suggests that the studied relationship 
is maybe sensitive to the measure of firm performance. 
Statistical issues 
Test for multicollinearity 
I run Model (1) with the options for multicollinearity diagnostics. The result is in Panel 
B. According to Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), when the largest condition index is 
larger than 100, the coefficient estimates might have a "fair amount" of numerical error 
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due to multicollinearity. In our sample, the maximum conditional index is approximately 
64, which is much lower than 100, thus I can conclude that multicollinearity does not 
cause serious problem with this study. 
Endogeneity issue 
In the first essay, we have a potential problem of endogeneity because executive 
compensation may be determined on the basis of firm performance, and a good 
compensation policy motivates executives to work better in order to increase firm value. I 
employ Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation to deal with this potential 
endogeneity problem. In the first stage, I run the regressions of main independent 
variables, which are CEO compensation, TMT total pay, and TMT pay dispersion, on 
firm and industry specific control variables and compute their predicted values. In the 
second step, I run the regression of firm performance on predicted values of independent 
variables previously computed. The result in Panel C shows that the relationship between 
firm performance and TMT compensation, adjusted for endogeneity effect, is statistically 
significant. Importantly, the tournament effect hypothesis is strongly supported. We 
should notice also that the signs of TMT total compensation and CEO compensation 
effects change, meaning that these effect may be sensitive to performance measure. 
Generalized linear model 
I also use a generalized linear model with maximum likelihood estimation to run the 
regression of firm performance on TMT compensation to overcome some limitations of 
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the OLS model, and the results in Panel D are consistent with those of Model (1). 
Specifically, the association between firm performance and TMT compensation in terms 
of pay dispersion and total pay is positive and statistically significant. 
Panel regressions 
As do most of the articles in the literature, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
for the main analysis. On the one hand, this technique is simple, easy to interpret, and 
does not lose any observations in the analysis. On the other hand, OLS regressions ignore 
the panel nature of the compensation data: the combination of a cross section of firms and 
times series over the period from 1992 to 2010. For this reason, it is important to use 
panel regression to study the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance. 
We can categorize panel models according to the structure of error terms such as one-way 
or two-way models, fixed-effect and random effect models, autoregressive models, or 
moving-average models. For robustness check purposes, in this essay I use five panel 
models: one-way fixed-effect, one-way time fixed-effect, two-way fixed effect, one-way 
random-effect, and two-way random-effect. I construct the balanced panel data requiring 
that the firms have compensation and financial data for all years from 1992 to 2010. The 
final data sample includes 2,299 firm-year observations from 121 firms in 37 industries 
over the period 1992 to 2010. As we can see, we lose a good number of observations in 
our panel data, and it is a disadvantage of panel data models. 
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Panel E presents the results of these panel models: These results are consistent and they 
are identical to the results of the OLS models. In all panel regressions, firm performance 
is positively and significantly associated with TMT compensation dispersion and TMT 
total pay. Firm performance is negatively and significantly related to CEO compensation. 
The results show that it is important to investigate the effect of TMT compensation 
beyond the CEO pay effect, and provide very strong empirical evidence for the 
tournament effect hypothesis. 
2.5 Summary 
This essay investigates the effect of TMT compensation on firm performance analyzing 
both the summation and dispersion of TMT compensation and controlling for the effects 
of CEO compensation, firm specific characteristics, and industry specific characteristics. 
The research provides some interesting empirical results. On the one hand, TMT 
compensation positively and significantly influences firm performance, even after 
controlling for the effect of CEO pay. Specifically, this positive, significant and large 
impact of TMT pay dispersion on firm performance strongly supports the tournament 
effect hypothesis. This effect and the significant and positive relationship between TMT 
total pay and firm performance suggest that we should explore further the effect of TMT 
compensation on financial decisions, although this relationship may be sensitive to 
performance measure. On the other hand, the effect of CEO pay on firm performance is 
negative in several specifications. This may suggest the ineffectiveness of CEO pay in 
firm performance. 
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In short, this essay suggests that executive compensation research should focus not only 
on CEO compensation but also on the compensation of all executives as a team, and, 
consistent with the upper echelon perspective, TMT compensation does play an important 
role in firm performance. 
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3. CFO PAY STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Literature review 
Executive pay structure 
In the first paper we find that the level of executive compensation in terms of TMT 
compensation and CEO compensation is significantly associated with firm performance. 
While TMT total compensation and pay dispersions are positively related to firm 
performance, the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is not 
positive as expected. In this second essay I will investigate the impact of executive pay 
structure on firm performance, focusing on the impact of CFO pay structure. 
Murphy (1999) provides a description of executive compensation structure. The main 
components of executive pay are base salary, annual bonus plan, and stock options. Other 
pay components are restricted stocks, long-term incentive plan, health care plan, 
retirement plan, and so on. Typically, the formal employment will specify a minimum 
base salary, target bonus payment, terms of stock options and other salary plans. 
According this study (Murphy 1999), the base salary is set mainly based on industry 
benchmarking. The base salaries for CEOs of similar firms in terms of size within the 
same industry tend to be similar to each other. Although base salaries comprise a 
decreasing portion of total compensation, executives do pay a lot of attention to these 
base salaries because they are the key component of the executive employment contract. 
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Murphy finds that the base salary is significantly associated with firm size, and that, 
during the 1990s, stock options replace base salaries as the highest portion of total 
compensation. As the base salary is a fixed component in the compensation, a higher base 
salary would lead to higher values of other components as most of these components may 
be measured as a percent of base salary. 
CEO and other executives of the firms receive annual bonus plans based on firm 
performance in a given year, for this reason the bonus is the first component of executive 
compensation with the incentives to increase firm performance. Annual bonus plans can 
be characterized by performance measures, performance standards, and the relationship 
between performance and pay. Typically, the firms pay no bonus until an achievement of 
threshold performance, pay a minimum bonus at the threshold performance, and bonus 
payments have a cap or upper limit. Although annual bonus plans provide incentives to 
increase stockholders' wealth in terms of firm profitability as executives will only receive 
bonus payments if the firm achieves some threshold limits in performance, bonus plans 
also create incentive effects of firm performance measures in terms of manipulation of 
accounting profits, incentive effects of performance standards, and incentive effects of 
pay-performance structure (Murphy 1999). 
Stock options give the executives the right to buy stocks at a predetermined price for a 
pre-specified time, sometimes stock options are referred as equity-based compensation. 
The incentives of executives here is to buy stocks at low prices and then increase stock 
prices. This increase in stock prices also increases the wealth of stockholders. Executive 
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stock options are non-tradable and voided if executives leave the company before the 
time specified in the employment contract. In practice, most options expire in ten years 
and are granted at fair market prices. There is a notable trend in executive compensation 
that stock options explode and contribute the single biggest portion of executive pay 
(Murphy 1999). 
Several studies have investigated the relationship between executive compensation 
structure and firm performance. Mehran (1995) analyzes compensation structure and firm 
performance together with firm ownership and states that pay structure, especially equity-
based compensation, rather than pay level, motivates managers to increase firm value. He 
also finds the important impact of ownership in the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance. 
Rayton (2003) investigates the relation between firm performance and compensation 
structure of average employees in terms of performance elasticity and suggests a link 
between average employee compensation structure and performance in US 
manufacturing industries. This link is stronger for high performance firms and 
indistinguishable from zero for low performance. 
Blackwell, Dudney and Farrell (2007) analyze the changes in CEO compensation 
structure and its influence on firm performance after CEO turnover. They find that the 
incoming CEOs do change their compensation structure in comparison to that of outgoing 
CEOs with more stock options and new stock grants. They also document a significant 
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association between CEO pay structure change in terms of new stock grants and firm 
performance after CEO turnover. 
The literature of CFO compensation is much more limited in comparison to that of CEO 
compensation. Among these few researchers, some find an increasing association 
between CFO compensation and the organizational performance of hospitals in the US 
(Early and Cleverly 1995), others find a mixed association between CFO compensation 
and firm performance in banking industry (Bisson 2009). Bisson also concludes that there 
is a little connection between executive compensation structure and firm performance. 
CEO versus CFO in corporate finance 
In other fields of corporate finance, some researchers explore the role of CFO and 
compare it with the role of CEO in financial decisions of the firms. Some researchers 
(Jiang, Petroni and Yanyan 2010) investigate the influences of CEOs and CFOs on 
earnings manipulation. They document that, although both CEOs and CFOs influence 
accruals management, the impact of CFOs is stronger because CFOs are mainly 
responsible for financial reporting. They find that the probability and magnitude of 
beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to the equity incentives of CFO than those of 
CEO, this finding provides support for SEC requirement of CFO disclosures in 2006. 
In another article (Feng, Ge, Luo and Shevlin 2011), Feng and colleagues try to explain 
the reasons why CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations. They find that 
CFOs of manipulation firms and CFOs of non-manipulation firms have similar equity 
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incentives, while CEOs of manipulating firms have more power than CEOs of non-
manipulating counterparts. They propose that CFOs become involved in accounting 
management not because of their own immediate financial benefits but because of the 
pressure from their CEOs. 
Other researchers (Chava and Pumanandam 2010) also analyze the difference between 
CEOs and CFOs in terms of incentives and corporate policies. They investigate risk-
taking incentives on corporate financial policies and find that both CEO incentives and 
CFO incentives have a significant impact on the financial policies of the firms. They also 
find a causal link between executive compensation incentives and corporate policies, and 
suggest that both CEO and CFO incentives are important in designing optimal 
compensation for the firms. 
The literature investigates possible links between executive compensation and the current 
financial crisis. Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010) provide a case study about the 
executive compensation issues of failed firms such as Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers. 
They find that the top executive managers of these firms received very large 
performance-based compensation during the period 2000-2008, just before the financial 
crisis, and that some pay arrangements provide executives with excessive risk-taking 
incentives, which possibly help to cause the financial crisis in 2007-2008. 
37 
Gaps in the literature 
Although CFOs are playing an increasingly important role in corporate finance, most 
research papers studying the impact of executive compensation on firm performance 
focus only on the CEO compensation structure, and the number of studies of CFO pay 
structure on firm performance is very limited. This essay will cover this gap by analyzing 
the effect of the CFO compensation structure on firm performance, and contribute to the 
literature by providing empirical evidence for the importance of CFO compensation on 
corporate finance decisions. 
Research question and hypotheses 
This second essay investigates how CFO compensation structure relates to firm 
performance, and whether this impact, if any, is significant after controlling for the 
impact of CEO pay structure. Investigating the main question about the association 
between CFO compensation structure and firm performance, this essay hypothesizes that 
CFO compensation structure in terms of bonus and stock options does significantly relate 
to firm performance, and that this relationship is still significant even after controlling for 
the effect of CEO compensation structure. 
This hypothesis, is supported, suggests that CFOs play an increasingly important role in 
corporate financial decision-making; as a consequence, those responsible for executive 
compensation structure policy should not only focus on the CEO pay structure but also 
pay more attention to the effect of the CFO pay structure on firm performance. 
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3.2 Data and methodology 
Data 
I collect the executive compensation data from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp 
database, which includes more than 1500 S&P firms each year from 1992 to 2010, 
including S&P 500, Midcap and Smallcap index firms. This list of companies changes 
from year to year because companies leave the S&P classified list of firms and other 
companies enter the list according to the selection criteria from Standard and Poor's 
company. 
While the compensation data of executives and particularly that of CEOs are available in 
general for long periods from 1992 to the present, the data for CFO compensation has 
been available only since 2006 as required by SEC. For each firm-year unit in my sample 
I collect the data of both CEO compensation and CFO compensation and then merge 
them into a dataset for further analysis. 
Similar to the first essay, the second essay also uses basic accrual and financial data such 
as total assets, common equity, total debt, market value, free cash flows, sales growth, 
and so forth from Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database. 
39 
Variables 
The dependent variable: 
I use Tobin's Q as the measure of firm performance for the main analysis. 
Independent variables: 
The main independent variables are CFO pay structure variables measured by CFO bonus 
portion and CFO stock options portion. As their names indicate, the CFO bonus portion is 
the percentage of bonus on CFO total compensation and the percentage of stock options 
on CFO total compensation respectively. 
I plot the CFO pay and CEO pay over years and over industries in Figure 4 as well as the 
CFO options and CEO option in Figure 5: 
[Insert figure 4 here] 
[Insert figure 5 here] 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between CFO pay and CEO pay, and we can observe a 
close relationship between these compensations over years as well as over industries. 
More importantly, Figure 5 presents a positive correlation between CFO pay structure 
and CEO pay structure in terms of options. It is a signal of collinearity and I will deal 
with this issue in more detail in the methodology and robustness check sections. 
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Control variables: 
In this essay, I use variables related to CEO compensation structure such as CEO bonus 
portion and CEO stock options portion to control for the effects of CEO pay on firm 
performance, which are more widely investigated in the literature and found related to 
firm performance. 
Similar to the first essay, the second essay also uses firm specific control variables such 
as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, and sales growth. Some 
variables are measured in logarithm and others are standardized to reduce the potential 
problem of nonstationarity. I also apply the process of winsorizing for many financial 
data variables to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers by excluding observations 
with the values of variables such as Tobin's Q, firm size, leverage, free cash flows, sales 
growth, and book to market are above the top or below the bottom 1 percentile of the 
sample data. Industry specific control variable is the performance mean of all firms in the 
same 2-digit SIC industry. 
Table 7 presents the definitions and measures of all variables used in the second essay: 




After computing CEO compensation structure variables, CFO compensation structure 
variables, and other firm/industry specific control variables, I merge all the variables into 
a data sample for main analysis. This data sample includes 7,414 firm-year observations 
from 1,898 firms in 65 industries over the period from 2006 to 2010. 
Table 8 represents the summary statistics of dependent variable, firm performance; 
independent variables such as CEO bonus portion, CEO options portion, CFO bonus 
portion, and CFO options portion; as well as firm specific and industry specific control 
variables such as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, sales growth, 
and industry performance. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
Correlation coefficients 
Table 9 shows displays the Pearson correlation coefficients among firm performance, 
CFO pay structure, and control variables in this essay: 
[Insert table 9 here] 
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Unlike in the first essay, in the second essay I do not find any pair of variables with 
extremely high correlation coefficients, and I keep all the variables and do not exclude 
any variable from my analysis. 
Methodology 
I run the regression of firm performance on CFO pay structure variables, CFO bonus and 
CFO options, controlling by effects of CEO pay structure as well as firm and industry 
specific characteristics: 
Firm performance = Po + Pi CFO Bonus Portion + ft2 CFO Stock Options Portion 
+P3 CEO Bonus Portion + ft4 CEO Stock Options Portion + 27 /?, Control 
variables (5) 
Model (5) is the main model of this essay. In this model, we can interpret the sign and 
significance of coefficients Pi and P2 to investigate the effect of CFO compensation 
structure on firm performance after controlling for all CEO pay structure as well as firm 
and industry-specific characteristics. We can also compare the effect of CFO pay on firm 
performance to that of CEO compensation structure by comparing the magnitude and 
significance of Pi and P2 to those of p3 and p4 if they are significant. 
I exclude CEO structure from Model (6) and run the regression of firm performance on 
CFO pay structure only to study its effect on firm performance: 
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Firm performance = Po + Pi CFO Bonus Portion + P2 CFO Stock Options Portion 
+ £ Pi Control variables (6) 
In this model, if pi and/or /?? are significant, this is the first evidence that the 
compensation structure of the CFO does influence firm performance, or CFO pay 
structure and firm performance are statistically significantly related. 
Finally, I run the regression of firm performance on CEO pay structures to investigate 
whether it independently affects firm performance: 
Firm performance = Po + P3 CEO Bonus Portion + @4 CEO Stock Options Portion 
+ Z ^  Control variables (7) 
Similarly, in Model (7), the significance of the coefficients p3 and/or P4 will confirm that 
firm performance and CEO pay structure are statistically and significantly associated 
with each other after controlling for firm and industry characteristics. Model (6) and 
Model (7) also provides a simple way to deal with multicollinearity issue: 
Multicollinearity is not a serious issue if the beta coefficients do not change much in 
comparison to those in Model (5) in terms of sign and significance. 
3.3 Empirical results 
Table 10 presents the empirical results of this second essay: 
[Insert table 10 here] 
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Model (5) confirms that pay structure of CFO and CEO are significantly associated with 
firm performance. The CFO stock options portion and CEO stock options portion 
positively relate to the performance of their firms. More importantly, we can observe that 
in this model the impact of CFO pay structure on firm performance is positive and very 
significant even after controlling for CEO pay structure as well as other firm and industry 
specific characteristics. 
Even more, we can observe that at first glance CFO options portion's impact is stronger 
than the impact of CEO options portion on firm performance in both magnitude in terms 
of coefficient values and significance in terms of t-value. I use the method of Gujarati 
(2004) to statistically compare these coefficients as following. First, I run Model (5) with 
appropriate options to obtain coefficient estimates of CFO options portion and CEO 
options portion as well as the variance - covariance matrix of these estimates, this matrix 
is in Panel B of Table 10. Second, I compute t-statistics according to the formula: 
PcFO options~HCEO options 
Jvar(/?CF0 options) + var{pCE0 options) 2cov(/?cfo Options, PcEO options) 
From Panel A and Panel B of Table 5,1 compute t = 1.89, and this statistic supports the 
alternative hypothesis that ($CF0 options > PCEO options with a 5% confidence level. In 
other words, I find that the effect of the CFO option portion on firm performance is 
stronger than that of the CEO option portion on firm performance. 
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Model (6) demonstrates that CFO pay structure, in terms of CFO stock options portion in 
the total compensation package is positively associated with firm performance. The 
association between CFO bonus portion and firm performance is negative but not 
significant. The results show the empirical evidence that CFO compensation structure 
does influence significantly firm performance, and suggest that CFO compensation is 
playing an important role in firm performance 
Model (7) finds a similar relationship between CEO compensation structure and firm 
performance. Specifically, the CEO stock options portion positively affects firm 
performance in the sense that some of the coefficients of CEO pay structure variables are 
statistically significant. Regarding CEO bonus portion, its relationship to firm 
performance is also negative but not significant. These results are consistent with the 
literature documenting that the effect of stock options on firm performance becomes 
increasingly stronger and that of bonus becomes weaker over time (Murphy 1999). 
The effects of firm specific and industry specific control variables in Model (5) are very 
similar in Model (6) and Model (7). Firm size, firm leverage, and book to market ratio are 
negatively and significantly related to firm performance, and industry performance is 
positively and significantly associated with firm performance. We can also observe some 
interesting patterns from the effects of control variables in Model (6) and Model (7). For 
example, firm size, firm leverage, and book to market ratio are negatively and 
significantly associated with firm performance, while free cash flows and average 
performance of the industry are positively and significantly associated with firm 
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performance as expected. The association between sales growth and firm performance is 
positive but also small in magnitude. 
Overall, the empirical results show that CFO pay structure significantly relates to firm 
performance. The CFO compensation's stock options portion statistically and 
significantly associate with firm performance, although the bonus portion does not. This 
impact is even stronger when controlling for the possible effects of CEO compensation. 
This empirical evidence may further explain the reason why the SEC requires firms to 
disclose executive compensation structure from 2002 and specially focuses on CFO 
compensation from 2006. 
3.4 Robustness check 
Similar to the first essay, in this section I also use different measure of firm performance, 
check for potential econometric issue of multicollinearity, and employ different 
techniques such as maximum likelihood estimation and panel regression to investigate 
the relationship between firm performance and CFO compensation structure. Table 11 
presents all the results of these robustness checks. 
[Insert table 11 here] 
Performance measure 
When I use earnings per share (EPS) as a firm performance measure to investigate 
relationship of executive compensation on firm performance measure, I find a positive 
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and significant relationship between CFO options and firm performance, which is 
consistent with Model (5). The CEO options portion also positively relates to firm 
performance, although the significance level of this relationship is lower. We can observe 
also that the CFO bonus portion and the CEO bonus portion seem to have insignificant 
association with firm performance. 
Statistical issues 
Test for multicollinearity 
Panel B shows the multicollinearity diagnostics for Model (5). I conclude that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem in this essay because the maximum condition 
index is approximately 27. In more details, Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that 
a condition index higher than 100 will cause serious errors due to collinearity. 
Generalized linear model 
Panel C presents the regression results when using a generalized linear model with 
maximum likelihood estimation, and these results are very consistent with those 
previously obtained from Model (5). 
Panel regressions 
The second essay also uses panel models for robustness check purpose to explore 
accurately the panel nature of compensation and financial data as the combination of 
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cross sectional and times series data. Five panel models used are one-way fixed-effect, 
one-way time fixed-effect, two way fixed effect, one-way random-effect, and two-way 
random-effect. 
I construct the balanced panel data merging CFO compensation structure, CEO 
compensation structure and firm financial data. The final panel data contains 3,975 firm-
year observations from 795 firms in 63 industries over the period from 2006 to 2010.1 
run Model (5) using five different specifications. The results are in Panel D. 
Overall, the results are identical to those from Model (5). In details, the relationship 
between CFO pay structure in terms of stock options portion and firm performance is 
positive and statistically significant. This impact is still significant when we control for 
CEO compensation effect. 
3.5 Summary 
Following the still young literature studying the impact of CFO's on corporate finance 
decisions, the second essay investigates the impact of CFO compensation structure on 
firm performance, and achieves some important research results and may provide useful 
suggestions in practice. 
The essay proposes and demonstrates empirically that the CFO compensation structure, 
in terms of the portion of stock options in the total compensation, influences positively 
and significantly firm performance, even after controlling for the impact of the CEO 
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compensation structure and other effects. The essay also confirms the results in the 
literature that the CEO pay structure, especially the CEO stock options portion does 
influence positively firm performance. More importantly, the second essay shows that the 
impact of CFO compensation structure on firm performance is stronger than that of CEO 
compensation structure in terms of both value and t-statistic of their coefficients in the 
corresponding regressions. This result is still strongly robust for different measures of 
firm performance and regression models. 
This essay suggests that researchers and policy makers on executive compensation 
structure should not focus only on CEO compensation structure but also pay more 
attention to CFO compensation structure when analyzing the executive pay structure 
effect on firm performance. More generally, CFOs should receive more attention in the 
investigation of corporate finance because CFOs are playing an increasingly important 
role in corporate financial management. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation investigates the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance analyzing both level and structure of executive compensation. I do not only 
focus on the effect of CEO compensation but also explore the effect of compensation on 
all top executives of the firm as a team, as well as the effect of CFO compensation 
because of their increasing importance in firm business decision making. 
The first essay investigates executive pay level, focusing on the effect of TMT 
compensation on firm performance and finds that TMT compensation in terms of the 
compensation dispersion among executives of Top Management Team does influence 
firm performance significantly and positively. The results strongly support the 
tournament effect hypothesis. The first essay also shows that the effect of TMT total 
compensation on firm performance is also positive and statistically significant, although 
it may be sensitive to performance measure. Interestingly, the effect of CEO 
compensation on firm performance is statistically significant but negative, indicating that 
CEO pay is probably not effective. 
The second essay analyzes executive pay structure exploring the influence of CFO pay 
structure on firm performance. On the one hand, this essay finds the empirical support for 
the literature stating that CEO pay structure in terms of CEO stock options portion has a 
significant and positive effect on firm performance. On the other hand, the essay shows 
that CFO compensation structure also positively and significantly relates to firm 
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performance after controlling the impact of CEO pay structure and other firm and 
industry characteristics. This effect of CFO pay structure is even stronger than that of 
CEO compensation structure. 
This dissertation suggests that future research on executive compensation should focus 
not only on CEO compensation but also on compensation of top executives as a team 
TMT, as well as CFO compensation. Analyzing all these features will provide us a more 
comprehensive and complete picture of executive compensation and executive pay effect 
on firm performance. It is important not only in academic research but also in the 
practical financial decisions of the firms. 
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Table 1. Brief summary Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database 
(Source: CompuStat.com) 
ExecuComp includes annual compensation data from 1992 forward of the top executive officers 
within a company. In total, this database contains compensation data of more than 32,000 top 
executives from over 2,900 companies over the period from 1992 to present. Each year 
ExecuComp includes annual compensation data of top executives of about S&P 1500 companies, 
from which 600 are small, 400 are mid and 500 large cap firms. Following are the datasets that 
are provided. Fields identifying unique records for each table are noted in parenthesis. 
N Description 
1 ANNCOMP - (co_per_rol + year). Lists all named executives, titles, and their compensation 
data. Compensation data includes salary, stock options, bonuses, and shares owned. 
2 BLACKSCHOLESMEANS - (Year) Applies to the 1992 reporting format only. Includes 
the highest and lowest volatility and yield figures that were used the Compustat Black 
Scholes Model. A descripion of this model is available on the S&P Compustat website at 
www.compustatresources.com. 
3 CODIRFIN - (gvkey + year).Includes director compensation data for 2005 and prior as well 
as company financial data. The director compensation data includes items such as: number 
of board meetings, annual options received, annual shares received, and annual retainer. The 
company financial data includes various income statement and balance sheet data items in 
addition to market value and share price data. 
4 COLEV - (gvkey).Contains company level information. The company level information 
includes items such as: address, SIC, CUSIP number, ticker, stock exchange, and industiy/ 
index information. 
5 COPEROL - (co_per_rol).Contains items specific to each person working at a given 
company. Items such as: most recent title held, when executive became/left CEO, when 
executive joined/left company, and reason for leaving company. 
6 DEFERREDCOMP - (co_per_rol + year + defer_id).Applies to the current reporting format 
only.Includes detailed information about deferred compensation plans including 
contribution information and individual plan balances. 
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7 DIRECTORCOMP - (gvkey + year + dirnbr).Applies to the current reporting format 
only.Includes compensation information by director, including items such as cash fees, 
stock awards, and pension compensation. 
8 LTAWDTAB - (co_per_rol + year + awdnum).Applies to the 1992 reporting format only. 
Contains data pertaining to long term incentive awards. It includes information such as: 
shares awarded, value of shares, and payout term. 
9 OUTSTANDINGAWARDS - (co_per_rol + year + outawdnum).Applies to the current 
reporting format only. Includes detailed information about outstanding option and restricted 
stock awards. 
10 PENSION - (co_per_rol + year + penid).Applies to the current reporting format 
only.Includes detailed information about executive pension plans including the credited 
years of service and the plan value. 
11 PERSON - (execid).Provides specific executive information. Items such as: first and last 
name, age and gender. 
12 PLANBASEDAWARDS - (co_per_rol + year + grntnum).Applies to the current reporting 
format only.Includes detailed information about option, stock, and long-term incentive 
awards made to executives during the year. Data items include the option exercise price, the 
grant date fair value of the stock/option award, and the potential cash payout under cash-
based incentive plans. 
13 STGRTTAB - (co_per_rol + year + grntnum).Applies to the 1992 reporting format 
only.Contains data pertaining to stock option grants. It includes information such as: stock 
option value, exercise price, market price, and expiration date. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission implemented a major overhaul in the requirements for 
reporting executive compensation data for companies with fiscal years ending in December 2006 
and later. Many items in the database apply to only one of the reporting formats. 
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Table 2. Variable definitions, TMT pay level and firm performance 
(Source: ExecuComp) 
This table presents the definitions of all variables used in the first essay such as firm performance, 
executive pay, TMT pay dispersion and mean, TMT total pay, CEO pay and other control 
variables such as firm size, leverage, book to market ratio, free cash flows, sake growth and 
industry performance. 
The data is selected from ExecuComp database with all not null data items in a single 
observation, moreover, total assets, market value, common equity must be positive. 
Variables Description 
Firm performance Tobin's Q 
TMT pay dispersion The ratio of the standard deviation divided by the mean of executive pay 
of all TMT members 
TMT total pay The logarithm of summation of executive pay of all TMT members 
TMT mean pay The logarithm of mean of executive pay of all TMT members 
CEO pay The logarithm of CEO's total compensation 
Firm size The logarithm of total assets 
Firm leverage 1 - (common equity / total assets) 
Book to market ratio (common equity / market value) 
Free cash flows Operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets of 
the firm 
Sales growth Percent sale change in 1 year 
Industry performance The mean of Tobin's Q of all companies in the same 2-digit-SIC 
industry 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics, TMT pay level and firm performance 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables used 
in the regression of firm performance on TMT compensation. The definitions and measures of 
these variables are in table 2. 
Variables N Mean StdDev Sum Minimum Maximum 
Firm performance (1) 26951 1.8490 1.1124 49834 0.7448 9.0273 
TMT pay dispersion (2) 26951 0.7138 0.3453 19240 0.0004 3.4105 
TMT total pay (3) 26951 8.8074 0.9992 237369 4.7770 14.2838 
TMT mean pay (4) 26951 7.0459 0.9931 189896 3.3907 12.6743 
CEO pay (5) 26951 7.6105 1.2422 205111 -6.9077 14.2791 
Firm size (6) 26951 7.4875 1.6316 201797 2.5745 11.9901 
Firm leverage (7) 26951 0.5568 0.2164 15006 0.0776 1.0000 
Book to market (8) 26951 0.5183 0.3258 13971 0 2.3974 
Free cash flows (9) 26951 0.1309 0.0888 3529 -0.4072 0.4333 
Sales growth (10) 26951 12.6771 25.3205 341661 -50.3000 219.6130 
Industry performance (11) 26951 1.8598 0.5422 50125 0.9016 5.4509 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients, TMT pay level and firm performance 
This table presents the correlation coefficients among variables in the first essay about the relationship between TMT compensation and 
firm performance. The variable definitions and measures are in table 2. 
Var (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Firm performance (1) 1.0000 
TMT pay dispersion (2) 0.1738 1.0000 
TMT total pay (3) 0.1818 0.4915 1.0000 
TMT mean pay (4) 0.1893 0.4595 0.9777 1.0000 
CEO pay (5) 0.0912 0.4753 0.8299 0.8397 1.0000 
Firm size (6) -0.2272 0.1221 0.5967 0.5744 0.4974 1.0000 
Firm leverage (7) -0.3940 -0.0227 0.1343 0.1118 0.1460 0.5456 1.0000 
Book to market (8) -0.6096 -0.1568 -0.2427 -0.2447 -0.1781 0.0328 0.0804 1.0000 
Free cash flows (9) 0.4649 0.1058 0.1565 0.1622 0.1330 -0.1376 -0.3157 -0.3946 1.0000 
Sales growth (10) 0.2444 0.0951 0.0794 0.0877 0.0446 -0.0776 -0.0897 -0.1958 0.1346 1.0000 
Industry performance (11) 0.4725 0.0754 0.0178 0.0087 -0.0268 -0.3378 -0.4005 -0.3461 0.2403 0.1240 
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Table 5. Pooled regression of Arm performance on TMT compensation level 
This table shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on TMT compensation. 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables 
are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay. Control variables are CEO pay and other 
firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and measures are in table 2. 
Models: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat 
Intercept 1.4260 26.41 1.5525 28.66 2.2129 55.97 1.4963 28.75 
TMT pay dispersion 0.1001 6.46 0.0666 3.95 0.2042 15.15 
TMT total pay 0.2298 23.92 0.1309 18.11 0.1463 23.26 
CEO pay -0.1001 -15.55 
Firm size -0.0661 -14.62 -0.0642 -13.78 -0.0091 -2.70 -0.0685 -15.47 
Firm leverage -1.0047 -37.00 -1.0308 -38.35 -1.1255 -41.88 -1.0261 -37.71 
Book to market -1.4469 -89.35 -1.4552 -88.57 -1.5039 -93.26 -1.4552 -89.49 
Free cash flows 1.8793 32.31 1.8380 31.36 1.9687 33.80 1.8310 31.38 
Sales growth 0.0035 19.54 0.0036 19.99 0.0038 20.99 0.0036 20.16 
Industry performance 0.3229 32.71 0.3312 33.25 0.3534 35.75 0.3303 33.35 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5559 0.5520 0.5466 0.5517 
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Table 6. Robustness check 
Panel A: Use of EPS as a measure of firm performance in Model (1) 
This panel shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on TMT compensation. 
The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Earnings per Share (EPS). Main 
independent variables are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay. Control variables are CEO pay 
and other firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and measures are in table 2. 
Variable 
Coefficient t Value 
Dependent variable: Firm performance (EPS) 
Intercept 12.1558 7.38 
TMT pay dispersion 1.1372 2.19 
TMT total pay -3.4619 -10.79 
CEO pay 0.3381 1.58 
Firm size 2.5873 17.21 
Firm leverage -8.0083 -8.92 
Book to market -2.4703 -4.72 
Free cash flows 7.6559 3.90 
Sales growth 0.0196 3.18 
Industry performance 1.1158 65.32 
Adjusted R-Square 0.1500 
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel B: Multicollinearity diagnostics 
This table shows the collinearity diagnostics among regressors of Model (1) using tol, vif and 
collin options. 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Proportion of Variation 
Condition Tmt Log Log 
# Eigenvalue Index Intercept PayDispersion TmtTotalPay CEOPay ... 
1 8.235700 1.000000 0.000099 0.001670 0.000040 0.000117 
2 0.817470 3.174060 0.000028 0.000001 0.000007 0.000023 
3 0.412150 4.470140 0.000003 0.004580 0.000004 0.000018 
4 0.207900 6.293900 0.000026 0.124350 0.000068 0.000408 
5 0.155750 7.271630 0.000241 0.470970 0.000021 0.000004 
6 0.107000 8.773220 0.002170 0.104070 0.000251 0.000197 
7 0.040670 14.230260 0.000856 0.112950 0.006200 0.030090 
8 0.013190 24.986540 0.070080 0.069080 0.008360 0.137520 
9 0.008160 31.766740 0.468700 0.057420 0.003310 0.366810 
10 0.002010 64.084040 0.457800 0.054910 0.981740 0.464810 
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel C: 2SLS results 
This panel shows the results of 2SLS regression to solve for endogeneity problem. In the first 
stage, I run the regressions of main independent variables on controlling variables and compute 
the predicted values of these independent variables. In the second stage, I run the regression of 
dependent variable on these predicted values. The main dependent variable is firm performance, 
measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay. 
Control variables are CEO pay and other firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and 
measures are in table 2. 
Models: (1-2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) 
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat 
Dependent variable IV1 IV2 IV3 Q 
Intercept 0.4304 24.52 5.4975 146.95 4.3162 79.57 3.6438 27.70 
TMT pay disp. (IV1) 18.7893 126.24 
TMT total pay (IV2) -1.9068 -20.18 
CEO pay (IV3) 0.2099 2.48 
Firm size 0.0422 28.11 0.4650 145.18 0.4544 97.85 
Firm leverage -0.1281 -10.64 -0.8584 -33.46 -0.6313 -16.97 
Book to market -0.1147 -15.92 -0.4931 -32.12 -0.4436 -19.93 
Free cash flows 0.1670 6.39 1.1738 21.08 1.6290 20.18 
Sales growth 0.0009 11.44 0.0024 14.05 0.0017 6.82 
Industry performance 0.0343 7.75 0.2055 21.76 0.1321 9.65 
Adjusted R-Square 0.0585 0.4913 0.3139 0.4887 
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel D: GLM using MLE 
This panel shows the results of generalized linear model of TMT compensation on firm 
performance using maximum likelihood technique. The dependent variable is firm performance, 
measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables are TMT pay dispersion and TMT total pay. 
Control variables are CEO pay and other firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and 
measures are in table 2. 
(1.6) 
Variable 
Coefficient p Value 
Dependent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q) 
Intercept 1.4260 <.0001 
TMT pay dispersion 0.1002 <.0001 
TMT total pay 0.2299 <.0001 
CEO pay -0.1001 <.0001 
Firm size -0.0662 <.0001 
Firm leverage -1.0048 <.0001 
Book to market -1.4469 <.0001 
Free cash flows 1.8793 <.0001 
Sales growth 0.0036 <.0001 
Industry performance 0.3230 <.0001 
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Table 6. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel E: panel regressions 
This table presents the results of panel regressions of firm performance on TMT compensation. The models are one-way fixed-effect (1.7), 
one-way time fixed-effect (1.8), two way fixed effect (1.9), one-way random-effect (1.10) and two-way random-effect (1.11). Dependent 
variable, independent variables, and variable definitions and measures are in table 2. 
Variable 
Fix one (1.7) Fix one time (1.8) Fix two (1.9) Ran one (1.10) Rantwo(l.ll) 
Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value 
Independent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q) 
Intercept 0.8249 2.81 0.4084 1.92 1.5950 3.98 0.8265 3.66 0.7754 2.96 
TMT pay dispersion 0.1615 3.85 0.1595 3.47 0.1175 2.75 0.1971 4.75 0.1335 3.18 
TMT total pay 0.1933 7.78 0.1042 4.16 0.1632 6.14 0.1440 6.14 0.1523 6.04 
CEO pay -0.0395 -3.37 -0.0446 -4.15 -0.0306 -2.63 -0.0401 -3.52 -0.0297 -2.63 
Firm size -0.1858 -6.54 0.0485 3.48 -0.2363 -6.99 -0.0744 -3.31 -0.0669 -2.92 
Firm leverage -1.0394 -7.80 -1.0140 -10.85 -1.2461 -9.29 -0.9403 -7.71 -1.0634 -8.72 
Book to market -0.9888 -14.59 -1.2985 -19.64 -1.0039 -14.49 -1.0593 -16.01 -1.0577 -15.76 
Free cash flows 4.6786 16.06 5.2164 20.12 4.7198 16.01 4.8839 17.51 4.9378 17.52 
Sales growth -0.0001 -0.09 0.0011 1.44 0.0009 1.27 0.0001 0.08 0.0004 0.62 
Industry performance 0.5163 12.69 0.2876 9.84 0.5259 10.99 0.4666 12.54 0.4294 10.60 
R-Square 0.7748 0.6606 0.7862 0.5022 0.4855 
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Table 7. Variable definitions, CFO pay structure and firm performance 
Data source: ExecuComp 
This table shows the definitions and measures of all variables used in the second essay. 
The data is selected from ExecuComp database with all not null data items in a single 
observation, moreover, total assets, market value, common equity must be positive. 
Variables Description 
Firm performance Tobin's Q 
CFO Bonus Portion The ratio of CFO bonus divided by CEO total pay 
CFO Options Portion The ratio of CFO stock options divided by CEO total pay 
CEO Bonus Portion The ratio of CEO bonus divided by CEO total pay 
CEO Options Portion The ratio of CEO stock options divided by CEO total pay 
Firm size The log of total assets 
Firm leverage 1 - (common equity / total assets) 
Book to market ratio (common equity / market value) 
Free cash flows Operating income before depreciation (OIBD) divided by total assets of 
the firm 
Sales growth Percent sale change in 1 year 
Industry performance The mean of Tobin's Q of all companies in the same 2-digit-SIC 
industry 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics, CFO pay structure and firm performance 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of dependent, independent and control variables used 
in the regression of firm performance on CFO pay structure. The definitions and measures of 
these variables are in table 7. 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum 
Firm performance 7414 1.7237 0.9383 12780 0.7456 8.7940 
CFO Bonus Portion 7414 0.0531 0.1190 394.3042 0 0.9727 
CFO Options Portion 7409 0.1145 0.2209 848.3897 0 1.0000 
CEO Bonus Portion 7414 0.0451 0.1219 334.4017 0 1.0000 
CEO Options Portion 7405 0.1615 0.2649 1196 0 1.0000 
Firm size 7414 7.7466 1.6251 57434 2.5745 11.9901 
Firm leverage 7414 0.5469 0.2198 4055 0.0776 0.9997 
Book to market ratio 7414 0.5707 0.3579 4232 0.0007 2.3527 
Free cash flows 7414 0.1241 0.0892 920.3868 -0.4072 0.4330 
Sales growth 7414 8.3038 21.9818 61565 -50.1150 213.3100 
Industry performance 7414 1.7264 0.4298 12800 0.9547 3.6880 
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Table 9. Pearson correlation coefficients, CFO pay structure and firm performance 
This table presents the correlation coefficients among variables in the second essay about the relationship between CFO compensation 
structure and firm performance. The variable definitions and measures are in table 7. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
TobinQ (1) 1.00 
CFOBonus (2) -0.06 1.00 
CFOOptions (3) 0.29 -0.11 1.00 
CEOBonus (4) -0.04 0.66 -0.02 1.00 
CEOOptions (5) 0.28 -0.05 0.42 -0.12 1.00 
LogFirmSize (6) -0.23 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 1.00 
Leverage (7) -0.33 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 -0.10 0.51 1.00 
BTM (8) -0.64 0.07 -0.23 0.03 -0.24 0.08 0.07 1.00 
FCF (9) 0.50 -0.04 0.18 -0.01 0.20 -0.08 -0.29 -0.43 1.00 
SaleGrowth (10) 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.07 0.16 -0.05 -0.12 -0.19 0.20 1.00 
IndTobinQ (11) 0.45 -0.02 0.12 0.00 0.10 -0.32 -0.38 -0.39 0.25 0.16 1.00 
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Table 10. Regression of firm performance on CFO compensation structure 
Panel A: OLS results 
This table shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on CFO compensation 
structure. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent 
variables are CFO Bonus Portion and CFO Options Portion. Control variables are CFO Base 
Salary, CEO Bonus Portion, CEO Options Portion, and other firm/industry specific variables. 
Variable definitions and measures are in table 7. 
Variable 
(5) (6) (7) 
Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value 
Dependent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q) 
Intercept 2.1478 33.00 2.1620 33.12 2.1849 33.44 
CFO Bonus Portion 0.0754 0.93 -0.0383 -0.63 
CFO Options Portion 0.3392 9.35 0.4373 12.98 
CEO Bonus Portion -0.1688 -2.13 -0.1082 -1.82 
CEO Options Portion 0.2340 7.66 0.3410 12.01 
Firm size -0.0430 -8.29 -0.0387 -7.45 -0.0420 -8.06 
Firm leverage -0.5332 -12.97 -0.5570 -13.52 -0.5584 -13.54 
Book to market ratio -1.1537 -47.28 -1.1761 -48.31 -1.1770 -48.28 
Free cash flows 2.1113 22.57 2.1503 22.93 2.1283 22.64 
Sales growth 0.0019 5.86 0.0020 6.23 0.0022 6.65 
Industry performance 0.2916 14.68 0.2897 14.53 0.2921 14.63 
Adj R-Sq 0.5477 0.5467 0.5516 
72 
Table 10. Regression of firm performance on CFO compensation structure (continued) 
Panel B: Variance/covariance matrix of coefficient estimates from Model (5) 
CFO CFO CEO CEO Log Sale Ind 
Intercept Bonus Options Bonus Options Firm Size Leverage BTM FCF Growth TobinQ 
Intercept 0.00424 -0.00001 -0.00014 -0.00020 -0.00009 -0.00017 -0.00081 -0.00082 -0.00169 0.00000 -0.00101 
CFO Bonus -0.00001 0.00654 0.00045 -0.00427 -0.00028 -0.00001 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00020 0.00000 -0.00003 
CFO Options -0.00014 0.00045 0.00132 -0.00034 -0.00042 0.00000 0.00010 0.00009 -0.00006 0.00000 0.00000 
CEO Bonus -0.00020 -0.00427 -0.00034 0.00628 0.00040 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00002 -0.00016 0.00000 0.00003 
CEO Options -0.00009 -0.00028 -0.00042 0.00040 0.00093 -0.00001 0.00009 0.00009 -0.00017 0.00000 0.00001 
Log Firm Size -0.00017 -0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 -0.00010 -0.00001 -0.00005 0.00000 0.00001 
Leverage -0.00081 0.00004 0.00010 -0.00002 0.00009 -0.00010 0.00169 0.00021 0.00105 0.00000 0.00022 
BTM -0.00082 -0.00008 0.00009 0.00002 0.00009 -0.00001 0.00021 0.00060 0.00085 0.00000 0.00017 
FCF -0.00169 0.00020 -0.00006 -0.00016 -0.00017 -0.00005 0.00105 0.00085 0.00875 0.00000 0.00000 
Sales growth 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
IndTobinQ -0.00101 -0.00003 0.00000 0.00003 0.00001 0.00001 0.00022 0.00017 0.00000 0.00000 0.00039 
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Table 11. Robustness check 
Panel A: Use of EPS as firm performance measure 
This table shows the results of pooled regressions of firm performance on CFO compensation 
structure. The dependent variable is firm performance, measured by EPS. Main independent 
variables are CFO Bonus Portion and CFO Options Portion. Control variables are CFO Base 
Salary, CEO Bonus Portion, CEO Options Portion, and other firm/industry specific variables. 
Variable definitions and measures are in table 7. 
Variable 
(5.1) 
Coef. t Value 
Dependent variable: Firm performance (EPS) 
Intercept -1.9789 -4.87 
CFO Bonus Portion 0.1713 0.34 
CFO Options Portion 0.5710 2.52 
CEO Bonus Portion 0.5040 1.02 
CEO Options Portion 0.3402 1.78 
Firm size 0.5739 17.68 
Firm leverage -1.4157 -5.51 
Book to market ratio -0.9454 -6.20 
Free cash flows 9.8696 16.89 
Sales growth 0.0123 5.90 
Industry performance -0.6316 -5.09 
Adj R-Sq 0.1212 
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Table 11. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel B: Test for multicollinearity 
This table shows the collinearity diagnostics among regressors of Model (5) using tol, vif and 
collin options. 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
Proportion of Variation 
Eigen Condition CFO CFO CEO 
Number value Index Intercept Bonus Options Bonus 
1 6.3035 1.0000 0.0003 0.0028 0.0046 0.0023 ... 
2 1.4705 2.0704 0.0000 0.1107 0.0471 0.1212 ... 
3 1.0697 2.4275 0.0003 0.0260 0.0986 0.0465 ... 
4 0.7331 2.9323 0.0000 0.0130 0.1540 0.0100 ... 
5 0.4585 3.7079 0.0000 0.0696 0.5360 0.0498 ... 
6 0.3807 4.0689 0.0000 0.0093 0.0294 0.0123 ... 
7 0.2637 4.8894 0.0000 0.7658 0.1162 0.7560 ... 
8 0.1832 5.8656 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 0.0001 ... 
9 0.0991 7.9769 0.0067 0.0015 0.0096 0.0000 ... 
10 0.0292 14.6972 0.0039 0.0005 0.0024 0.0003 ... 
11 0.0089 26.5889 0.9886 0.0001 0.0021 0.0015 ... 
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Table 11. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel C: GLM and Maximum Likelihood technique 
This panel shows the results of generalized linear model of the relationship between CFO pay 
structure and firm performance using maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is 
firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q. Main independent variables are CFO pay structure 
measured by CFO bonus portion and CFO options portion. Control variables are CEO pay 
structure and firm/industry specific variables. Variable definitions and measures are in table 7. 
Variable 
Coef. p Value 
Dependent variable: Firm performance (Tobin's Q) 
Intercept 2.1478 <.0001 
CFO Bonus Portion 0.0755 0.3504 
CFO Options Portion 0.3393 <.0001 
CEO Bonus Portion -0.1688 0.0330 
CEO Options Portion 0.2340 <.0001 
Firm size -0.0431 <.0001 
Firm leverage -0.5332 <.0001 
Book to market ratio -1.1538 <.0001 
Free cash flows 2.1114 <.0001 
Sales growth 0.0020 <.0001 
Industry performance 0.2916 <.0001 
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Table 11. Robustness check (continued) 
Panel D: Panel regressions 
This table presents the results of panel regressions of firm performance on CFO compensation structure. The models are one-way fixed-
effect (5.3), one-way time fixed-effect (5.4), two way fixed effect (5.5), one-way random-effect (5.6) and two-way random-effect (5.7). 
The dependent variable is firm performance. Variable definitions and measures are in table 7. Tobin's Q is dependent variable. 
Fix one (5.3) Fixonetime(5.4) Fix two (5.5) Ran one (5.6) Ran two (5.7) 
Variable 
Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value Coef. t Value 
Intercept 2.7884 8.90 2.0155 23.25 3.2245 9.86 1.4689 12.69 1.4613 12.29 
CFO Bonus Portion -0.1099 -1.38 0.0257 0.26 -0.0820 -1.03 -0.0939 -1.22 -0.0811 -1.04 
CFO Options Portion 0.1553 4.77 0.3063 7.16 0.1742 5.36 0.1893 5.95 0.2017 6.24 
CEO Bonus Portion 0.1078 1.29 -0.1731 -1.74 0.1080 1.30 0.0505 0.63 0.0323 0.40 
CEO Options Portion 0.1415 5.05 0.2040 5.69 0.1615 5.76 0.1687 6.17 0.1795 6.47 
Firm size -0.3018 -10.12 -0.0316 -4.83 -0.3812 -11.74 -0.0565 -4.94 -0.0566 -5.11 
Firm leverage -0.5404 -5.49 -0.5232 -9.65 -0.4821 -4.84 -0.4049 -5.57 -0.3714 -5.14 
Book to market ratio -0.5346 -17.05 -1.1263 -33.78 -0.5167 -15.92 -0.6990 -23.87 -0.7025 -23.12 
Free cash flows 1.7114 11.49 2.4252 18.31 1.7998 12.07 2.0653 15.52 2.1538 16.03 
Sales growth 0.0002 0.70 0.0013 2.83 0.0008 2.40 -0.0002 -0.75 0.0001 0.30 
Industry performance 0.6768 22.52 0.2750 10.52 0.7488 17.93 0.5817 21.77 0.5668 17.64 
R-Square 0.8687 0.5743 0.8704 0.4638 0.3644 
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Figure 1. Graph of CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay 
Panel A: Years 
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Figure 1. Graph of CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay (continued) 
Panel B: Industries 
This panel plots the CEO pay, TMT total pay, and TMT mean pay over industries. 
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Figure 2. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables before winsorizing 
Panel A: Tobin's Q 
This graph plots the value of Tobin's Q before winsorizing process. 
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Figure 2. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables before winsorizing (continued) 
Panel B: Book to Market 
This graph plots the value of Book to Market ratio before winsorizing process. 
Plots of series BTM before winsorizing 
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Figure 3. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables after winsorizing 
Panel A: Tobin's Q 
This graph plots the value of Tobin's Q after winsorizing process. 
Plots of series Tobin Q after winsorizing 
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Figure 3. Tobin's Q and Book to Market variables after winsorizing (continued) 
Panel B: Book to Market 
This graph plots the value of Book to Market ratio after winsorizing process. 
Plots of series BTM after winsorizing 
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Figure 4. Graph of CEO pay and CFO pay 
Panel A: CEO pay and CFO pay over years. 
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Figure 4. Graph of CEO pay and CFO pay (continued) 
Panel B: CEO pay and CFO pay over industries. 










Figure 5. Graph of CEO options and CFO options 
Panel A: CFO pay structure and CFO pay structure over years. 
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Figure 5. Graph of CEO options and CFO options (continued) 
Panel B: CFO pay structure and CFO pay structure over industries. 
Plots of CEO and CFO options over industries 
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